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Introduction
Global systems of the 20th century were 
designed to address inter-state tensions 
and civil wars. War between nation-
states and civil war have a given logic…
21st century violence does not fit the 20th 
century mould…Violence and conflict 
have not been banished…But because of 
the success in reducing inter-state war, 
the remaining forms of violence do not 
fit neatly either into “war” or “peace”, or 
into “political” or “criminal” violence.  
(World Bank 2011)
The idea that twenty-first century organised 
violence is different from the wars of the 
twentieth century has been widely debated 
in both the scholarly and the policy litera-
ture. Various terms have been used to con-
ceptualise contemporary conflict – wars 
among the people, wars of the third kind, 
hybrid wars, privatized wars, post-modern 
wars as well as  ‘new wars’ (Duffield 2001; 
Eppler 2002; Hables Gray 1997; Hoffman 
2007; Holsti 1996; Kaldor 2012; Munkler 
2005; Smith 2005; Snow 1996; Van Creveld 
1991). But it is the term ‘new’ that seems 
to have stuck and become the main butt of 
the critics.
This article1 defends the concept of ‘new 
wars’. Engaging with and countering the 
various criticisms that have been brought 
forward against the term ‘new’, it makes 
the argument that the ‘new’ in ‘new wars’ 
has to be understood as a research strategy 
and a guide for policy. Because the ‘old’ is 
enshrined in the concept of the ‘new’ the 
term enables us to grapple with the overall 
logic that is inherent in contemporary vio-
lent conflicts and that makes them different 
in kind from ‘old wars’. It is a logic that goes 
Kaldor, M 2013 In Defence of New Wars. Stability, 2(1): 4, pp. 1-16, 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.at
ArtIcle
In Defence of New Wars
Mary Kaldor*
This article reviews the literature on ‘new wars’. It argues that ‘new wars’ should be 
understood not as an empirical category but rather as a way of elucidating the logic 
of contemporary war that can offer both a research strategy and a guide to policy. 
It addresses four components of the debate: whether new wars are ‘new’; whether 
new wars are war or crime; whether the data supports the claims about new wars; 
and whether new wars are ‘post-Clausewitzean’. It argues that the obsession with 
the ‘newness’ of wars misses the point about the logic of new wars; that there is 
a blurring of war and crime but it is important to address the political elements 
of new wars; that, although the data should be used with caution, it does seem to 
offer support for some elements of the new war thesis; and that the argument is 
indeed post-Clausewitzean because new wars are not ‘contests of wills’ but more 
similar to a mutual enterprise. It concludes that the debate has greatly enriched 
the overall argument.
* London School of Economics and Political  
Science, United Kingdom 
M.H.Kaldor@lse.ac.uk 
stability
Kaldor: In Defence of New WarsArt. 4, page 2 of 16
beyond specific components of contempo-
rary conflicts – identity politics or economic 
predation, for example. Rather, it provides an 
integrative framework for analysis. 
This essay addresses four main thrusts 
of criticism: whether new wars are ‘new’; 
whether new wars are ‘war’; whether exist-
ing data confirms or negates the findings 
about the nature of new wars; and whether 
new wars can be described as post-Clause-
witzean. Before doing so, it is worth issu-
ing a note of caution. One of the problems 
with many of the critics is that they lump 
together the different versions of the argu-
ment and treat criticism of one particular 
aspect contained in one particular version 
as a criticism of the whole argument. Such 
claims include the identification of new 
wars with civil wars, the claim that they are 
only fought by non-state actors and only 
motivated by economic gain, or that they 
are deadlier than earlier wars (Berdal 2003; 
de Graaf 2003; Kalyvas 2001; Mellow 2010). 
In particular, many of the critics employ 
reductionist arguments whereby new wars 
are associated with a particular aspect of 
contemporary wars, for example, crime or 
privatisation or brutality, and fail to take 
into account the overall conceptual frame-
work that relates actors, goals, methods and 
forms of finance. This essay will try to avoid 
this trap and focus on my own version of 
New Wars (Kaldor 1999). Before discussing 
the critiques, I will start with a summary of 
this particular ‘new wars’ argument.
the logic of new wars
 New Wars are the wars of the era of globalisa-
tion. Typically, they take place in areas where 
authoritarian states have been greatly weak-
ened as a consequence of opening up to the 
rest of the world. In such contexts, the dis-
tinction between state and non-state, public 
and private, external and internal, economic 
and political, and even war and peace are 
breaking down. Moreover the break down of 
these binary distinctions is both a cause and 
a consequence of violence.
New wars have a logic that is different 
from the logic of what I call ‘old wars’ – the 
idea of war that predominated in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. In the origi-
nal version of the argument, I derived this 
logic from the differences between old and 
new wars in actors, goals, methods and forms 
of finance. These are:
•	 Actors: Old wars were fought by the 
regular armed forces of states. New wars 
are fought by varying combinations of 
networks of state and non-state actors 
– regular armed forces, private security 
contractors, mercenaries, jihadists, war-
lords, paramilitaries, etc.  
•	 Goals: Old wars were fought for geo-
political interests or for ideology 
(democracy or socialism). New wars are 
fought in the name of identity (ethnic, 
religious or tribal). Identity politics has 
a different logic from geo-politics or ide-
ology. The aim is to gain access to the 
state for particular groups (that may be 
both local and transnational) rather than 
to carry out particular policies or pro-
grammes in the broader public interest. 
The rise of identity politics is associated 
with new communications technolo-
gies, with migration both from country 
to town and across the world, and the 
erosion of more inclusive (often state-
based) political ideologies like socialism 
or post-colonial nationalism. Perhaps 
most importantly, identity politics is 
constructed through war. Thus political 
mobilisation around identity is the aim 
of war rather than an instrument of war, 
as was the case in ‘old wars’.
•	 Methods: In old wars, battle was the 
decisive encounter. The method of wag-
ing war consisted of capturing territory 
through military means. In new wars, 
battles are rare and territory is captured 
through political means, through con-
trol of the population. A typical tech-
nique is population displacement – the 
forcible removal of those with a different 
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identity or different opinions. Violence 
is largely directed against civilians as a 
way of controlling territory rather than 
against enemy forces.
•	 Forms of Finance: Old wars were largely 
financed by states (taxation or by out-
side patrons). In weak states, tax revenue 
is falling and new forms of predatory 
private finance include loot and pillage, 
‘taxation’ of humanitarian aid, Diaspora 
support, kidnapping, or smuggling in oil, 
diamonds, drugs, people, etc. It is some-
times argued that new wars are moti-
vated by economic gain, but it is difficult 
to distinguish between those who use 
the cover of political violence for eco-
nomic reasons and those who engage in 
predatory economic activities to finance 
their political cause. Whereas old war 
economies were typically centralising, 
autarchic and mobilised the population, 
new wars are part of an open globalised 
decentralised economy in which partici-
pation is low and revenue depends on 
continued violence.
The implication of these differences is that, 
whereas old wars tended to extremes as 
each side tried to win, new wars tend to 
spread and to persist or recur as each side 
gains in political or economic ways from 
violence itself rather than ‘winning’ (see 
Keen 2012). Whereas old wars were associ-
ated with state building, new wars are the 
opposite; they tend to contribute to the dis-
mantling of the state.
It is this logic of persistence and spread 
that I have come to understand as the key 
difference with old wars – something I 
elaborate in the last section, where I discuss 
whether new wars are post-Clausewitzean. 
Clausewitz was par excellence the theorist 
of old wars – for him, war was a contest of 
wills. In my version of new wars, war is rather 
a violent enterprise framed in political terms. 
It is important to stress that both old and 
new wars, in my formulation, are ideal types. 
They are ideas of war rather than empirical 
descriptions of war. The test of how well they 
fit empirical reality depends on whether they 
provide a guide to useful policy. As I discuss 
in the following sections, it is this point that 
is most often missed by the critics of the new 
wars thesis.2
Are new wars ‘New’?
The most common criticism of the ‘new wars’ 
argument is that new wars are not new. It is 
argued that the Cold War clouded our ability 
to analyse ‘small wars’ or ‘low-intensity wars’, 
that many of the characteristics of new wars 
associated with weak states can be found in 
the early modern period and that phenom-
ena like banditry, mass rape, forced popula-
tion displacement, or atrocities against civil-
ians all have a long history.
Of course this is true. Many of the features 
of new wars can be found in earlier wars. 
Of course the dominance of the East-West 
conflict obscured other types of conflict. 
But there is an important reason, which is 
neglected by the preoccupation with empiri-
cal claims, for insisting on the adjective ‘new’.
Critics of the ‘new wars’ thesis often con-
cede that what is useful about the analysis 
of ‘new wars’ is the policy implication of the 
argument. But this is precisely the point. The 
term ‘new’ is a way to exclude ‘old’ assump-
tions about the nature of war and to provide 
the basis for a novel research methodology. 
The aim of describing the conflicts of the 
1990s as ‘new’ is to change the way schol-
ars investigate these conflicts and thus to 
change the way policy-makers and policy-
shapers perceive these conflicts. Dominant 
understandings of these conflicts that under-
pin policy are of two kinds. On the one hand, 
there is a tendency to impose a stereotyped 
version of war, drawn from the experience 
of the last two centuries in Europe, in which 
war consists of a conflict between two war-
ring parties, generally states or proto-states 
with legitimate interests, what I call ‘Old 
Wars’. This term refers to a stylised form of 
war rather than to all earlier wars.  In such 
wars, the solution is either negotiation or 
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victory by one side and outside intervention 
takes the form of either traditional peace-
keeping – in which the peace-keepers are 
supposed to guarantee a negotiated agree-
ment and the ruling principles are consent, 
neutrality and impartiality – or traditional 
war-fighting on one side or the other, as in 
Korea or the Gulf War. On the other hand, 
where policy-makers recognise the short-
comings of the stereotypical understanding, 
there is a tendency to treat these wars as 
anarchy, barbarism, ancient rivalries, where 
the best policy response is containment, 
i.e. protecting the borders of the West from 
this malady. The use of the term ‘new’ is a 
way of demonstrating that neither of these 
approaches are appropriate, that these are 
wars with their own logic but a logic that is 
different from ‘old wars’ and which therefore 
dictates a very different research strategy and 
a different policy response. In other words, 
the ‘new wars’ thesis is both about the chang-
ing character of organised violence and 
about developing a way of understanding, 
interpreting and explaining the interrelated 
characteristics of such violence.
As Jacob Mundy (2011) puts it, in one of the 
more thoughtful contributions to the debate:
‘Whether we choose to reject, embrace or 
reformulate concepts such as…. new wars, 
our justifications should not be based on 
claims of alleged coherence with particular 
representations of history. Rather such con-
cepts should be judged in terms of their abil-
ity to address the very phenomena they seek 
to ameliorate’.
Even so, it can be argued that there are 
some genuinely new elements of contem-
porary conflicts. Indeed, it would be odd if 
there were not. The main new elements have 
to do with globalisation and technology. 
First of all, the increase in the destruc-
tiveness and accuracy of all forms of mili-
tary technology has made symmetrical war 
– war between similarly armed opponents 
– increasingly destructive and therefore 
difficult to win. The first Gulf war between 
Iraq and Iran was perhaps the most recent 
example of symmetrical war – a war, much 
like the First World War, that lasted for years 
and killed millions of young men, for almost 
no political result. Hence, tactics in the new 
wars necessarily have to deal with this reality.
Secondly, new forms of communications 
(information technology, television and 
radio, cheap air travel) have had a range of 
implications. Even though most contempo-
rary conflicts are very local, global connec-
tions are much more extensive, including 
criminal networks, Diaspora links, as well 
as the presence of international agencies, 
NGOs, and journalists. The ability to mobilise 
around both exclusivist causes and human 
rights causes has been speeded up by new 
communications. Communications are also 
increasingly a tool of war, making it easier, 
for example, to spread fear and panic than 
in earlier periods – hence, spectacular acts 
of terrorism. This does not mean, as Berdal 
(2011) suggests, that the argument implies 
that all contemporary wars involve global 
connections or that those connections are 
necessarily regressive. Rather, it is an ele-
ment in theorising the logic of new wars.
Thirdly, even though it may be the case 
that, as globalisation theorists argue, glo-
balisation has not led to the demise of the 
state but rather its transformation, it is 
important to delineate the different ways in 
which states are changing. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of state transformation is 
the changing role of the state in relation to 
organised violence. On the one hand, the 
monopoly of violence is eroded from above, 
as some states are increasingly embedded in 
a set of international rules and institutions. 
On the other hand, the monopoly of violence 
is eroded from below as other states become 
weaker under the impact of globalisation. 
There is, it can be argued, a big difference 
between the sort of privatised wars that 
characterised the pre-modern period and 
the ‘new wars’ which come after the modern 
period and are about disintegration.
These new elements are not the reason for 
the adjective ‘new’, however, even though 
they may help to explain the evolution of 
new wars. The point of the adjective ‘new’ 
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does not have to do with any particular fea-
ture of contemporary conflicts nor how well 
it resembles our assumptions about reality, 
but rather it has to do with the model of war 
and how the model I spell out is different 
from the prevailing models that underpin 
both policy and scholarship.  It is a model 
that entails a specific political, economic and 
military logic.
Many of the critics miss the point about the 
logic of new wars. For example, both Berdal 
(2011) and Malesovic (2010) make the point 
that identity politics are also about ideas – 
the idea of Greater Croatia, for example, says 
Berdal. In a trivial sense, that is true just as 
ideological conflicts can also be reduced to 
identity – a communist or a fascist identity 
as opposed to an ethnic or tribal identity, 
for example. But the point of making this 
distinction is to illuminate different politi-
cal logics, the way in which identity politics 
is associated with different practices, differ-
ent methods of warfare and different ways 
of relating to authority. Identity politics is 
about the right to power in the name of a 
specific group; ideological politics is about 
winning power in order to carry out a par-
ticular ideological programme. Typically, in 
new war contexts, for example, access to the 
state is about access to resources rather than 
about changing state behaviour; in such situ-
ations, competition for power tends to be 
based on identity rather than on program-
matic debate, even if the latter is more of an 
ideal than a reality. This helps to explain mili-
tary tactics – population displacement as a 
method of exerting political control – or the 
persistence of new wars, as fear is a neces-
sary long-term ingredient of identity politics. 
Berdal and Malesevic seem to be implying 
that the term ‘identity politics’ suggests that 
politics is a mask , which is instrumentalised 
for economic reasons; of course new wars 
are about politics – that is why they are wars 
– and of course identity is constructed, but 
so are all other forms of ideology. The point 
is that the distinction that I make between 
identity politics and ideology (democracy or 
socialism) and geo-political interest implies 
a different set of political practices and a dif-
ferent methodology of war.
Some critics of the ‘new wars’ argument 
say the term is too fuzzy – a ‘hodgepodge’, 
say Henderson and Singer (2002). Indeed, 
similar terms – like hybrid warfare, multi-
variant warfare, or complex warfighting – are 
explicitly about being a mixture. Thus, for 
example, multi-variant warfare refers to a 
‘spectrum of conflict marked by unrestrained 
Mad Max ways in which symmetric and 
asymmetric wars merge and in which Micro-
soft coexists with machetes and stealth tech-
nology met by suicide bombers’ (Evans 2003; 
Hoffman 2007). The problem with existing 
categorisations of conflict, however, is that 
they do not easily fit contemporary reality, a 
point that will be elaborated in the data sec-
tion, and consequently the policy prescrip-
tions that emerge out of them are confused 
and distorted. It is to be hoped that the cur-
rent debate will further refine the concept 
and lead to new categories that may displace 
the term ‘new’. 
A typical example of this type of criticism 
is the article by Sven Chojnacki. Chojnacki 
(2006) argues that the term ‘new wars’ is 
too vague and also ‘methodologically prob-
lematic because the criteria for identifying 
“new” wars are highly arbitrary, difficult 
to reproduce inter-subjectively, and diffi-
cult to reconcile with conflict theory’ (italics 
added). Chojnacki then goes on to establish 
his own categories based on actors – inter-
state, extra-state, intra-state, and sub-state 
– which entirely misses the point of new 
wars, in which the actors are both state and 
non-state, internal and external. It misses the 
point that the term ‘new wars’ is a critique of 
prevailing conflict theory.
Some critics concede that something like 
new wars exists. But that does not mean that 
‘old wars’ have gone away. Particularly after 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, some schol-
ars and policy makers warn of assuming that 
future wars will look like Iraq and Afghani-
stan. It is to be hoped that future wars will 
not be like Iraq and Afghanistan because 
these wars have been exacerbated by outside 
Kaldor: In Defence of New WarsArt. 4, page 6 of 16
military interventions. But nor are future 
wars likely to look like the wars of the twen-
tieth century. Of course, a return to old wars 
cannot be ruled out. It is possible to imag-
ine continued competitive arming by states, 
growing interstate tensions, and a tendency 
to forget the suffering of previous genera-
tions. But failure to deal with the ‘new wars’ 
of the present might make that possibility 
more plausible. The reconstruction of mili-
tarised states through external wars might 
come to be viewed as a way of re-establishing 
the monopoly of violence at national levels. 
As John Keegan puts it: ‘The great work of 
disarming tribes, sects, warlords and crimi-
nals – a principal achievement of monarchs 
in the 17th century and empires in the 19th 
– threatens to need doing all over again’ 
(Quoted in Mueller 2004: 172). In the pre-
sent economic crisis, where states are cutting 
defence budgets, there is a tendency to pro-
tect what is seen as the core defence task – 
preparation for ‘old war’ – and to squeeze the 
emerging capacity to contribute to global 
peace enforcement efforts.
Are new wars ‘War’?
Some writers argue that contemporary vio-
lence is mainly privatised and/or criminal 
and cannot therefore be properly described 
as war. A good example of this kind of 
thinking is John Mueller’s interesting book 
The Remnants of War. He claims that war is 
becoming obsolescent and what is left are 
thugs who are the ‘residual combatants’ 
(Mueller 2004). In other words, he defines 
war as ‘old war’. A similar argument is made 
by Martin Shaw (2003), who talks about 
‘degenerate wars’.
According to Mueller (2004: 115), ‘most 
of what passes for warfare to-day is cen-
trally characterised by the opportunistic and 
improvisatory clash of thugs, not by the pro-
grammed and/or primordial clash of civilisa-
tions –although many of the perpetrators do 
cagily apply ethnic, national or ideological 
rhetoric to justify their activities because to 
stress the thrill and profit of predation would 
be politically incorrect’.
There is a lot of sense in this line of argu-
ment. New wars can be described as mix-
tures of war (organised violence for political 
ends), crime (organised violence for private 
ends) and human rights violations (violence 
against civilians). The advantage of not using 
the term ‘war’ is that all forms of contempo-
rary violence can be regarded as wholly ille-
gitimate, requiring a policing rather than a 
political/military response. Moreover, much 
contemporary violence – like the drugs wars 
in Mexico or gang warfare in major cities – 
appears to have a similar logic to new wars, 
but has to be classified as criminal. The same 
sort of argument has been used in relation 
to terrorism. There has been widespread 
criticism of the term ‘war on terror’ because 
it implies a military response to terrorist vio-
lence when policing and intelligence meth-
ods, it is argued, would be more effective 
(Howard 2002). 
On the other hand, the political element 
does have to be taken seriously; it is part of 
the solution. Articulating a cosmopolitan 
politics as an alternative to exclusivist iden-
tity is the only way to establish legitimate 
institutions that can provide the kind of 
effective governance and security that Muel-
ler is proposing as a solution. War does imply 
organised violence in the service of political 
ends. This is the way it legitimises criminal 
activity. Suicide bombers in their farewell 
videos describe themselves as soldiers not as 
murderers. Even if it is the case, and it often 
is, that those who frame the violence in eth-
nic, religious or ideological terms are purely 
instrumental, these political narratives are 
internalised through the process of engag-
ing in or suffering from violence. Indeed, this 
is the point of the violence; it is only possi-
ble to win elections or to mobilise political 
support through the politics of fear. This is 
a point made strongly by Kalyvas in his Logic 
of Violence in Civil Wars. He quotes Thucy-
dides on ‘the violent fanaticism which came 
into play once the struggle had broken out 
….society had become divided into two ideo-
logically hostile camps, and each side viewed 
the other with suspicion’ (Kalyvas 2006: 78). 
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Overcoming fear and hostility does not nec-
essarily come about through compromise, 
even if that is possible, because compromise 
can entrench exclusivist positions; rather it 
requires a different kind of politics, the con-
struction of a shared discourse that has to 
underpin any legal response.
A related terminological issue concerns 
the word ‘conflict’. There is a legal difference 
between ‘war’ and ‘armed conflict’, which 
has to do with whether or not war has been 
formally declared. Most data sets assume a 
threshold below which violence cannot be 
counted as war – say a thousand battle deaths 
per year, as in the Correlates of War database 
(Correlates of War Project). Without wishing 
to be overly semantic, the term conflict does 
seem to imply a contestation around a legiti-
mate grievance that can be resolved either by 
victory of one side or through compromise; 
the term used in the Uppsala University Con-
flict Dataset is ‘contested incompatibility’ 
(UCDP 1988). Actually, conflict is endemic 
in all societies and necessary for change and 
adaptation. Democracy is a peaceful mecha-
nism for managing conflict. Violence, as 
Michel Wievorka (2009) contends, tends to 
be the opposite of conflict; it closes down 
debates and ‘encourages ruptures’. In ‘new 
wars’ the ‘sides’ need an ‘incompatibility’ in 
order to justify their existence.
the Debate about data
The ‘new wars’ argument is largely based on 
qualitative rather than quantitative data. It 
came out of empirical studies of the wars in 
the former Yugoslavia and the South Cauca-
sus as well as Sub Saharan Africa (Kaldor and 
Vashee 1997). This knowledge has since been 
augmented by research on Iraq and Afghani-
stan, but there were two quantitative claims 
that I used to back up the arguments that 
battles are becoming rare and most violence 
is directed against civilians. One concerned 
the dramatic increase in the ratio of civil-
ian to military casualties and the other con-
cerned the rise in the numbers of displaced 
people per conflict. Other data that could be 
relevant relate to the recurrence and/or per-
sistence of contemporary conflicts as well as 
the tendency to spread.
In fact, the quantitative data, despite 
claims to the contrary, does seem to confirm 
the claims about the nature of new wars even 
though this data has to be used cautiously 
because it largely derives from ‘old’ assump-
tions about conflict. The debate about data 
covers three broad areas: the numbers and 
duration of wars; the numbers of casualties; 
and the levels of forced displacement.
the numbers and duration of wars
There are three main sources for data on 
numbers of wars. These are:
 - The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme 
(UCDP), which is used by the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Insti-
tute (SIPRI) in its annual yearbook, the 
Human Security Report project and the 
World Bank (UCDP; SIPRI; Human Secu-
rity Report Project);
 - The Correlates of War roject at the Uni-
versity of Michigan (Correlates of War 
project); and 
 - The biennial Peace and Conflict Survey 
produced by the Center for Develop-
ment and Conflict Management at the 
University of Maryland (Peace and Con-
flict Survey). 
All three data sets are based on ‘old war’ 
assumptions. For violence to be counted as 
a war, there has to be a state involved at least 
on one side and there have to be a certain 
number of battle deaths. Moreover, they all 
distinguish between intra-state and inter-
state war, and some have added sub-state or 
non-state categories. Yet central to the ‘new 
wars’ argument is the difficulty of distin-
guishing between what is state or non-state 
and what is external or internal. So, none of 
these numbers are really able to capture the 
nature of new wars.
In particular, the emphasis on battle deaths 
has the counter-intuitive effect of leaving out 
major episodes of violence. As Milton Leiten-
berg (2006) puts it: ‘There were few “bat-
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tle deaths” in Cambodia between 1975 and 
1978, comparatively few in Somalia in 1990 
and 1991, or in Rwanda in 1994: but it would 
simply be bizarre if two million dead in Cam-
bodia, 350,000 in Somalia and 8000 or more 
in Rwanda were omitted from compilations’.
Nevertheless, the findings from the three 
databases do have some relevance to the new 
wars thesis. They all tend to concur in the fol-
lowing conclusions:
 - The virtual disappearance of wars 
between states;
 - The decline of all high intensity wars, 
involving more than a thousand battle 
deaths;
 - The decline in the deadliness of war 
measured in terms of battle deaths;
 - The increase in the duration and/or 
recurrence of wars; and
 - The risk factor of proximity to other 
wars.
In other words, there does seem to be a 
decline in ‘old wars’, which is largely what 
this data measures. There is also a decline 
in the numbers killed in battles, which is 
consistent with the argument about the 
decline of battle. And there does seem to be 
evidence for the argument that new wars are 
difficult to end and they tend to spread if we 
assume that the data does catch some ‘new 
war’ elements.
The UCDP has made the most effort to 
adjust to the new realities and has added 
data on episodes of one-sided violence and 
on non-state violent conflicts. Both of these 
numbers seem to be increasing and this 
again is consistent with the argument that 
new wars could be treated as cases of mutual 
one-sided violence and that low-level, low 
intensity persistent conflicts may be more 
typical nowadays.
Those who have criticised the new wars 
argument using this sort of data have tended 
to set up straw men to attack. Thus it is 
argued that new wars are civil wars and the 
decline in civil wars suggests that new wars 
are not increasing. But new wars are not the 
same as civil wars and no one has claimed 
that new wars are increasing or decreasing; 
the argument was always about the changing 
character of war. Bizarrely, critics have also 
suggested that the decline of battle severity 
is a critique of new wars when on the con-
trary it confirms the new wars argument 
(Melunder, Oberg and Hall 2009)
casualties
The problem with calculations about the 
ratio of civilian to military casualties is three 
fold. First, figures on civilian casualties are 
notoriously inaccurate. There are a variety of 
methods for calculating these numbers: reli-
ance on media and other reports of individ-
ual deaths, epidemiological surveys, opinion 
surveys and, where available, official death 
certificates. The results vary widely. Thus, cas-
ualties in the Bosnia war vary from 260,000 
(the number given by the Bosnian Informa-
tion Ministry and widely used by interna-
tional agencies at the time), of which 60,000 
were military, to 40,000 in the World Disas-
ters Report (Roberts 2010). Similarly, civilian 
casualties in the Iraq war have been the sub-
ject of huge debate; the numbers vary widely, 
from around 100,000 civilian casualties from 
violence (as of a 2011 estimate by Iraq Body 
Count, which relies on media reports and 
official documents) to over a million (based 
on an opinion survey in 2007, which asked 
Iraqis in all 18 governorates whether any 
member of their family had been killed) 
(ORB International).
Secondly, it is very difficult to distinguish 
combatants from civilians. The only figures 
for which there are accurate statistics are 
military casualties because these are for-
mally recorded by their governments. Hence, 
we know that, as of September 2012, there 
were some 4804 military casualties in Iraq, of 
which 4486 were American, and some 3202 
military casualties in Afghanistan, of which 
some 2136 were American (Iraq Coalition 
Casualty Count). But, since many combatants 
in new wars are police, militia, private con-
Kaldor: In Defence of New Wars Art.4, page 9 of 16
tractors, mercenaries, para-militaries or crim-
inals of various kinds, the figures for other 
military and civilian casualties are very diffi-
cult to identify. A good example are the fig-
ures produced by the Sarajevo Research and 
Documentation Centre. They collected death 
certificates for people killed in the 1992–5 
war and estimated that some 97,207 people 
were killed, of which 39,684 or 41% were 
civilian and 62,626 or 59% were soldiers. 
However, the number for soldiers included 
all men of military age. Since we know that 
it was mainly men of military age that were 
killed in ethnic cleansing operations and the 
majority of displaced people were women – 
and we also know that participation in the 
violence was very low, about 6.5% of the 
population – it is simply not credible that all 
those men were soldiers. It would presuppose 
that nearly all the 8000 men and boys killed 
in Srebrenica were soldiers, for example.
Thirdly it is very difficult to distinguish 
whether civilians were killed as a side effect 
of battle, as a result of deliberate violence 
(political or criminal), or as a result of the 
indirect effects of war – privation and dis-
ease. The Human Security Report suggests 
that deaths as an indirect effect of war 
have declined in contemporary wars. This 
is because wars are often highly localised 
and low-level and general improvements in 
healthcare or in immunisation continue dur-
ing the wars. The main method of calculating 
these indirect effects is through calculating 
the excess deaths that took place over and 
above what might have been expected from 
previous trends. The Human Security Report, 
for example, criticises the IRC report on casu-
alties in the war in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, which estimates that 5.4 million 
people died during the war who would not 
have died ‘had there been no war’; more than 
90% were estimated to have died from war-
exacerbated disease and malnutrition. The 
HSR argues that their estimate was based 
on an estimated infant mortality rate prior 
to the conflict that was too low, that their 
surveys were biased in favour of areas with 
a small population and a high death toll and 
that the true figure is probably much lower. 
So what can be said about the data on 
casualties? First of all, the data suggests an 
overall decline in all war-related deaths. One 
of the misapplied criticisms that have been 
made of the new wars thesis is that new wars 
scholars claim that atrocities in new wars are 
worse than in previous wars. The only claim 
that the new wars thesis makes is most vio-
lence in new wars consists of violence against 
civilians rather than combat – it would be 
mad to claim that violence against civilians 
is worse than the modernist state-based 
atrocities like the holocaust or the Soviet 
purges. Secondly, there has been a dramatic 
decline in battle deaths. If we compare all 
war-related deaths to battle deaths rather 
than civilian to military casualties, then it is 
possible to assert that the ratio has increased 
on a scale commensurate with the ‘new wars’ 
original claim (Lacin and Gleditsch 2005). 
Thirdly, casualties among regular soldiers 
are a very small proportion of total deaths in 
wars, both because there are fewer regular 
soldiers taking part in wars and because of 
the decline in battle. 
Finally, what is shocking about this whole 
debate is the fact that we have good and accu-
rate statistics for the deaths of men in state-
based uniforms, but information about the 
vast majority of victims is totally inadequate.
Forced displacement
No one disputes that the overall total dis-
placed population has increased. Indeed 
according to UNHCR, the figures for forcibly 
displaced people in 2010 were at their high-
est in fifteen years at 43.7 million, includ-
ing 15.4 million refugees, some 27.5 million 
internally displaced persons and 837,500 
individuals whose asylum applications had 
not been processed. But critics suggest that 
these numbers should be qualified in two 
respects. First, data collection has greatly 
improved, especially in relation to internally 
displaced persons. In particular, the main 
source of IDP data is the Norwegian Refugee 
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Council’s Internal Displacement Monitor-
ing Centre, which has only been collecting 
data since 1998 (IDMC). Before that date, the 
main source was UNHCR’s estimates of those 
IDPs of concern to UNHCR, a much lower 
figure. Secondly, refugee and IDP data tends 
to be cumulative, since many people do not 
return to their homes.
Nevertheless, recent conflicts – especially 
in Iraq, Somalia and Pakistan – do seem to 
confirm the contention that forcible dis-
placement is a central methodology of 
new wars. In Iraq, for example, some 4 mil-
lion people were displaced at the height of 
the war in 2006–2008; roughly half were 
refugees and half were internally displaced. 
Indeed, it can be argued that one reason 
for lower levels of deaths in war is that it is 
easier to spread fear and panic using new 
communications, so that more people leave 
their homes than formerly. At the same 
time, there does seem to be a trend towards 
increasing displacement per conflict. Using 
the American Refugee Council data, Myron 
Weiner (1996) calculated that the number 
of refugees and internally displaced persons 
per conflict increased from 327,000 per con-
flict in 1969 to 1,316,000 in 1992 (1992 was, 
of course, a peak year for conflict). Using the 
Uppsala Conflict Database and figures from 
UNHC and the IDMC, an upward trend in 
refugees and internally based persons can 
be observed per conflict. Figure 1 is broader, 
showing the rise in annual numbers of inter-
nally displaced persons in countries experi-
encing not only armed conflict, but what the 
UCDP describe as substate conflict and one-
sided violence.3
One conclusion from this discussion is the 
need to refine the displacement data, which 
could well offer a better indicator of human 
insecurity than some of the other numbers 
that are used.
the Debate about clausewitz
The final set of criticisms against the ‘new 
wars’ thesis has to do with the claim that 
new wars are post-Clausewitzean (Strachan 
and Herberg-Rothe 2007; Schuurman 2010). 
The reasons that are normally put forward 
for claiming that new wars are post-Clause-
witzean have to do with the Trinitarian con-
ception of war, the primacy of politics and 
the role of reason. Both John Keegan (2004) 
and Martin Van Creveld (1991) have sug-
gested that the Trinitarian concept of war, 
with its tripartite distinction of the state, the 
army and the people, is no longer relevant. 
Other authors suggest that war is no longer 
an instrument of politics and, indeed, that 
Figure 1: Rise in annual numbers of internally displaced persons in countries experiencing 
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the ‘divorce of war from politics’ is charac-
teristic of both pre-Clausewitzean and post-
Clausewitzean wars (Snow quoted in Ang-
strom 2003: 8). Along with these arguments, 
critics have also questioned the rationality of 
war. Van Creveld, for example, argues that it 
is ‘preposterous…to think that just because 
some people wield power, they act like cal-
culating machines that are unswayed by pas-
sions. In fact, they are no more rational than 
the rest of us’(1991: 10).
These arguments are rather trivial and, 
depending on how Clausewitz is interpreted, 
they can all be refuted. Huw Strachan (2007) 
points out that the trinity refers to ‘tenden-
cies’ or motivations rather than empirical cat-
egories. The point of the concept is to explain 
how a complex social organisation, made up 
of many different individuals with many dif-
ferent motivations, can become, in his words, 
the ‘personalised state’ – a ‘side’ in or party to 
war. ‘War’ says Clausewitz, ‘is, therefore, not 
only chameleon-like in character, because it 
changes colour in some degree in each par-
ticular case, but it is, also, as a whole, in rela-
tion to the predominant tendencies which 
are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of 
the original violence of its elements, hatred 
and animosity, which may be looked upon 
as blind instinct; the play of probabilities 
and chance, which make it a free activity of 
the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a 
political instrument, by which it belongs to 
pure reason’ (1968: 24). These different  ‘ten-
dencies’ – reason, chance and emotion – are 
mainly associated  with the state, the gener-
als and the people, respectively, but the word 
‘mainly’ or ‘more’ suggests that they are not 
exclusively associated with these different 
components or levels of warfare. 
Clausewitz argues that war is what unites 
the trinity. The trinity was ‘wondrous’ because 
it made possible the coming together of the 
people and the modern state. Obviously, the 
distinction between the state, the military, 
and the people is blurred in most new wars. 
New wars are fought by networks of state 
and non-state actors and often it is difficult 
to distinguish between combatants and civil-
ians. So, if we think of the trinity in terms of 
the institutions of the state, the army and the 
people, then it cannot apply. But if we think 
of the trinity as a concept for explaining how 
disparate social and ethical tendencies are 
united in war, then it is clearly very relevant.
A second issue is the primacy of politics. 
Among translators of Clausewitz, there is a 
debate about whether the German word poli-
tik should be translated as policy or politics. 
It can be argued that it applies to both if we 
roughly define policy as external, in terms 
of relations with other states, and politics as 
the domestic process of mediating different 
interests and views. 
New Wars are also fought for political 
ends and, indeed, war itself can be viewed 
as a form of politics. The political narrative 
of the warring parties is what holds together 
dispersed loose networks of paramilitary 
groups, regular forces, criminals, mercenar-
ies and fanatics, representing a wide array of 
tendencies – economic and/or criminal self-
interest, love of adventure, personal or fam-
ily vendettas, or even just a fascination with 
violence. It is what provides a license for 
these varying tendencies. Moreover, these 
political narratives are often constructed 
through war. Just as Clausewitz described 
how patriotism is kindled through war, so 
these identities are forged through fear and 
hatred, through the polarisation of us and 
them. In other words, war itself is a form 
of political mobilisation, a way of bringing 
together, of fusing the disparate elements 
that are organised for war. 
Understood in this way, war is an instru-
ment of politics rather than policy. It is about 
domestic politics even if it is a politics that 
crosses borders rather than the external pol-
icy of states.  If, for Clausewitz, the aim of war 
is external policy and political mobilisation, 
this means, in new wars, it is the other way 
round. Mobilisation around a political narra-
tive is the aim of the war and external policy 
or policy vis-à-vis the proclaimed enemy is 
the justification.
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So if new wars are an instrument of poli-
tics, what is the role of reason? ‘New wars’ 
are rational in the sense of instrumental 
rationality. But is rationality the same as rea-
son? The enlightenment version of reason 
was different from instrumental rationality. 
As used by Hegel, who was a contemporary 
in Berlin of Clausewitz, it had something 
to do with the way the state was identi-
fied with universal values, the agency that 
was responsible for the public as opposed 
to the private interest. The state brought 
together diverse groups and classes for the 
purpose of progress – democracy and eco-
nomic development. Clausewitz puts consid-
erable emphasis on the role of the cabinet 
in formulating policy and argues that the 
Commander-in-Chief should be a member 
of the cabinet. The cabinet, which in Clause-
witz’s time was a group of ministers advis-
ing the monarch, was thought to play a role 
in bringing together different interests and 
motivations and providing unifying, publicly 
justifiable arguments for both war and the 
conduct of war. Of course, members of the 
cabinet had their own private motivations, 
as do generals (glory, enrichment, jealousy, 
etc), but it is incumbent on them to come 
to some agreement, to provide the public 
face of the war and to direct the war, and 
this has to be based on arguments that are 
universally acceptable (universal, here, refer-
ring to those who are citizens of the state). 
In his description of the evolution of warfare 
and the state, which echoes Hegel’s stadial 
theory of history, he argues that only in the 
modern period can the state be regarded as 
‘an intelligent being acting in accordance 
with simple logical rules’ (Clausewitz 1968: 
342) and that this is associated with the rise 
of cabinet government where the ‘cabinet 
had become a complete unity, acting for the 
state in all its external relations’ (Clausewitz 
1968: 344).
The political narratives of new wars are 
based on particularist interests; they are 
exclusive rather than universalist. They 
deliberately violate the rules and norms of 
war. They are rational in the sense of being 
instrumental. But they are not reasonable. 
Reason has something to do with universally 
accepted norms that underpin national and 
international law.
However there is another argument about 
why new wars are post-Clausewitzean. This 
has to do with the fundamental tenets of 
Clausewitzean thought – his notion of ideal 
war. This is derived from his definition of 
war. ‘War’ he says ‘is nothing but a duel on 
an extended scale. If we would conceive as 
a unit the countless number of duels which 
make up a war, we shall do so best by sup-
posing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each 
strives by physical force to compel the other 
to submit to his will: each endeavours to 
throw his adversary, and thus render him 
incapable of further resistance. War therefore 
is an act of violence intended to compel our 
opponent to fulfil our will’ (Clausewitz 1968: 
5; italics in the original). Violence, he says, is 
the means. The ultimate object is the ‘com-
pulsory submission of the enemy to our will’ 
and, in order to achieve this, the enemy must 
be disarmed. 
He then goes on to explain why this must 
lead to the extreme use of violence. ‘Now 
philanthropists may easily imagine there is a 
skilful method of disarming and overcoming 
an enemy without causing great bloodshed….
However plausible this may appear, still it 
is an error, which must be extirpated; for 
in such dangerous things as war, the errors 
which proceed from a spirit of benevolence 
are the worst. As the use of physical power 
to the utmost extent by no means excludes 
the co-operation of intelligence, it follows 
that he who uses forces unsparingly, without 
reference to the bloodshed involved, must 
obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less 
vigour in its application. The former then dic-
tates the law to the latter, and both proceed 
to extremities to which the only limitations are 
those imposed by the amount of counteracting 
force on each side’ (Clausewitz 1968: 6; italics 
added). In other words, the inner nature of 
war – Absolute War – follows logically from 
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the definition as each side is pushed to make 
fresh efforts to defeat the other, a proposi-
tion that Clausewitz elaborates in Chapter 
1, through what he calls the three recipro-
cal actions according to which violence is 
‘pushed to its utmost bounds’ (1968: 7). For 
Clausewitz, combat is the decisive moment 
of war.
Real war may depart from ideal war for a 
variety of reasons, but as long as war fits his 
definition, it contains the logic of extremes 
and, in Chapter 2 of my book, I describe 
how that logic applied to ‘Old Wars’. It 
is this logic of extremes that I believe no 
longer applies in ‘new wars’. I have therefore 
reformulated the definition of war. I have 
defined war as ‘an act of violence involving 
two or more organised groups framed in 
political terms’. According to the logic of 
this definition, war could either be a ‘contest 
of wills’ as is implied by Clausewitz’s defi-
nition or it could be a ‘mutual enterprise’. 
A contest of wills implies that the enemy 
must be crushed and therefore war tends to 
extremes. A mutual enterprise implies that 
both sides need the other in order to carry 
on the enterprise of war and therefore war 
tends to be long and inconclusive.
‘New wars’ tend to be mutual enterprises 
rather than a contest of wills. The warring 
parties are interested in the enterprise of 
war rather than winning or losing, for both 
political and economic reasons. The inner 
tendency of such wars is not war without 
limits, but war without end. Wars, defined 
in this way, create shared self-perpetuating 
interest in war to reproduce political identity 
and to further economic interests.
As in the Clausewitzean schema, real 
wars are likely to be different from the ideal 
description of war. The hostility that is kin-
dled by war among the population may pro-
voke disorganised violence or there may be 
real policy aims that can be achieved. There 
may be outside intervention aimed at sup-
pressing the mutual enterprise or the wars 
may produce unexpectedly an animosity to 
violence among the population, undermin-
ing the premise of political mobilisation on 
which such wars are based.
This redefinition of war constitutes a dif-
ferent interpretation of war, a theory of war, 
whose test is how well it offers a guide to 
practice. Since it is an ideal type, examples 
can be used to support the theory, but it 
is, in principle, unprovable. The question 
is whether it is useful. Take the example 
of the ‘War on Terror’. Antonio Echevarria 
defines the ‘War on Terror’ in classic Clause-
witzean terms: ‘Both antagonists seek the 
political destruction of the other and, at 
this point, neither appears open to negoti-
ated settlement’ (2007: 211). Understood in 
this way, each act of terrorism calls forth a 
military response, which, in turns, produces 
a more extreme counterreaction. The prob-
lem is that there can be no decisive blow. 
The terrorists cannot be destroyed by mili-
tary means because they cannot be distin-
guished from the population. Nor can the 
terrorists destroy the military forces of the 
United States. But if we understand the ‘War 
on Terror’ as a mutual enterprise – what-
ever the individual antagonists believe – in 
which the American Administration shores 
up its image as the protector of the Ameri-
can people and the defender of democracy, 
those with a vested interest in a high military 
budget are rewarded and extremist Islamists 
are able to substantiate the idea of a Global 
Jihad and to mobilise young Muslims behind 
the cause, then action and counterreaction 
merely contribute to ‘long war’, which bene-
fits both sides. Understood in Clausewitzean 
terms, the proposed course of action is total 
defeat of the terrorists by military means. 
Understood in post-Clausewitzean terms, the 
proposed course of action is very different; it 
has to do with both with the application of 
law and the mobilisation of public opinion 
not on one side or the other, but against the 
mutual enterprise.
The contrast between new and old wars, 
put forward here, is thus a contrast between 
ideal types of war rather than a contrast 
between actual historical experiences. Of 
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course, the wars of the twentieth century, 
at least in Europe, were close to the old war 
ideal and the wars of the twenty first century 
are closer to my depiction of new wars. Con-
temporary wars may not actually conform 
to this description any more than earlier 
wars conformed to the old war description. 
Perhaps another way to describe the dif-
ference is between realist interpretations 
of war as conflicts between groups, usually 
states, that act on behalf of the group as a 
whole and interpretations of war in which 
the behaviour of political leaders is viewed as 
the expression of a complex set of political 
and perhaps bureaucratic struggles pursuing 
their particular interest or the interests of 
their faction or factions, rather than those of 
the whole. It can be argued that in the West-
phalian era of sovereign nation-states, a real-
ist interpretation had more relevance than it 
does today.
This conceptual distinction is not quite 
the same as the way I originally described 
‘new wars’ in terms of the involvement of 
non-state actors, the role of identity poli-
tics, the blurring of the distinction between 
war (political violence) and crime (violence 
for private interests) as well as the fact that, 
in new wars, battles are rare and violence 
is mainly directed against civilians (Kaldor 
2007). But it is not inconsistent with that ear-
lier description; it merely involves a higher 
level of abstraction.
conclusion
The debate about new wars has helped to 
refine and reformulate the argument. The 
debate about Clausewitz has facilitated 
a more conceptual interpretation of new 
wars, while the debate about data has led 
to the identification of new sources of evi-
dence that have helped to substantiate the 
main proposition.
The one thing the critics tend to agree is 
that the new war thesis has been important 
in opening up new scholarly analysis and new 
policy perspectives, which, as I have stressed, 
was the point of the argument (Newman 
2004; Henderson and Singer 2002). The 
debate has taken this further. It has con-
tributed to the burgeoning field of conflict 
studies. And it has had an influence on the 
intensive policy debates that are taking place 
especially within the military, ministries of 
defence and international organisations – 
the debates about counter-insurgency in 
the Pentagon, for example, or about human 
security in the European Union and indeed 
about non-traditional approaches to security 
in general. 
What is still lacking in the debate is 
the demand for a cosmopolitan political 
response. In the end, policing, the rule of law, 
justice mechanisms and institution-building 
depend on the spread of norms at local, 
national and global levels. And norms are 
constructed both through scholarship and 
public debate. If we are to reconceptualise 
political violence as ‘new war’ or crime and 
the use of force as cosmopolitan law enforce-
ment rather than war-fighting, then we have 
to be able to challenge the claims of those 
who conceptualise political violence as ‘old 
war’, and this can only be done through criti-
cal publicly-engaged analysis.
Notes
 1 I am grateful to Denisa Kostovicova and 
Sabine Selchow for comments on an ear-
lier draft and to Tom Kirk for help with 
the literature search.
 2 An exception is Ken Booth’s (2001) 
thoughtful essay that accepts the point 
about the logic of new wars, but is criti-
cal of what he sees as top-down, overly 
militarised policy implications. I have not 
addressed this argument in this essay, but 
it is a concern in much of my work on hu-
man security.
 3 I am grateful to Anouk Rigterink for as-
sistance with these numbers.
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